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1.  Introduction 
 Although for centuries conscientious objection was primarily claimed by those who for 
religious or ethical reasons refused to join the ranks of the military (whether out of a general 
principle or in response to a particular violent conflict), in recent decades a significant 
broadening of the concept can be seen. In Thailand, for example, doctors recently refused 
medical attention to injured policemen suspected of having violently repressed a demonstration. 
In Argentina a few public defenders have rejected for conscientious reasons to represent 
individuals accused of massive human rights violations. In different countries all over the world 
there are doctors who refuse to perform euthanasia, schoolteachers who reject to teach the theory 
of evolution, and students who refuse to attend biology classes where frogs are dissected. 
 In this piece I will focus my attention on an area where people are making increasingly 
frequent claims of conscientious objections to excuse themselves from legal obligations: the field 
of sexual and reproductive rights, particularly the case in Argentina.2 Various providers (doctors, 
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pharmacists, etc) use the protection of conscientious objection in order to deny providing 
services such as information on contraception or legal abortions, prescribing or dispensing 
contraception (including emergency contraception), performing tubal ligation or vasectomies, or 
carrying out lawful abortions. Occasionally, some health professionals and pharmacists even 
refuse to provide information on alternatives whose access for patients and clients is guaranteed 
by legislation. Some go further yet, refusing to refer patients to doctors who do not object to 
performing the service. Such cases are frequent in Argentina although few make it to the 
newspaper headlines as did the case of a mentally handicapped rape victim from the province of 
Entre Ríos who, despite benefiting from a court ruling in her province authorizing the 
interruption of her pregnancy, was not able to obtain through the provincial health system a legal 
abortion because of the lack of doctors willing to perform it. The National Health Secretary was 
obliged to have the woman transported to another province for the abortion to be carried out.3 
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 This work will advance some criteria to establish a more precise framework for 
conscientious objection than those currently in operation. The objection of health professionals, 
unlike the traditional cases of objection (such as the refusal of mandatory military service), 
affects the rights of third parties. For this and other reasons I will detail, the permissive strategies 
of the model I call “libertarian” (in which the scope of the objection is limitless) and of the 
model I call “conciliatory” (in which the referral of patients to non-objecting professional comes 
before the right to conscientious objection) run into serious problems, which is why I will argue 
in favor of a third model illuminated by the ideal of equality. From this perspective, it is unlikely 
that conscientious objection can be acceptable for sexual and reproductive health professionals. 
For it to be so, the limits on its exercise would have to be much stricter than those established by 
the conciliatory model and, in any case, endorsement of any objections would have to be 
subordinate to the prior existence of simple, non-discriminatory, universal access to sexual and 
reproductive health services. 
2. Conscientious Objection, Before and After 
 A) Traditional Conscientious Objection 
 The right of conscientious objection consists of the right not to be obligated to perform 
actions that contradict the deepest ethical or religious convictions of an individual.4 This right 
has its basis in the constitutional protections of the freedom of religion and conscience and of 
behavior that does not harm others (Articles 14, 19 of the Argentine Constitution). In our 
country, the reach of conscientious objection was debated in relative depth with regards to 
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military service when it was still mandatory and, more recently, has progressed in the legislation 
and regulations concerning sexual and reproductive health. 
 In 1982 under the dictatorship, the (so-called) Supreme Court considered two cases, 
Ascensio5 and Lopardo,6 emitting decisions in which a restricted conception of conscientious 
objection was implicit. The matter in question in Ascensio was the constitutionality of the 
expulsion from primary school of a 10 year-old Jehovah’s Witness who had refused to recite the 
patriotic oaths. The Court struck down the suspension on grounds that the punishment was 
excessive, that there was no prior misbehavior by the child, that there had been the possibility of 
applying less strict sanctions, that the child’s was a minor and dependent to the parents, and that 
the expulsion affected the child’s right to education under Article 14 of the Constitution.  The 
Court did not come close to recognizing any right to objection. It simply decided that it was 
appropriate to apply intermediate sanctions before resorting to the expulsion. In the Lopardo case 
the matter discussed was the constitutionality of a punishment assessed to a Jehovah’s Witness 
who had refused to wear the military uniforms (although he had shown up for his mandatory 
military service). Lopardo alleged that his freedom of religion and conscience were at stake. The 
Court ruled that the freedom of religion was not absolute and that it had to be reconciled with the 
duty, also constitutionally required, to perform military service. The antiliberal worldview of the 
Court under the dictatorship is summed up in its affirmation that “the exercise of the freedom of 
conscience is bound by the reasonable requirements of just public order, of the common good of 
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society, and of the protection of the existence and legitimate rights of the nation itself. . . .”7 This 
worldview does not leave any room for conscientious objection (and perhaps for any other right). 
 In 1989, a democratic Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider a case of 
conscientious objection.8 Gabriel Portillo had refused to appear for his mandatory military 
service, for which he had been condemned in a criminal court to perform his military service 
with an additional year as punishment. In the Supreme Court, Portillo challenged the 
constitutionality of the law requiring military service on the grounds that, among other reasons, it 
violated the freedom of ideology and of conscience protected by Article 14 of the Constitution, 
as his Catholic beliefs prevented him from using arms against another human being in violation, 
as he saw it, of the Fifth Commandment. He was willing, however, to perform any alternative 
service that would not imply the use of arms. In this case, the Court distanced itself (in 
Consideration 6) from the simplistic approach of Lopardo: “... The matter cannot be resolved by 
merely referring to the jurisprudence establishing that all rights are relative . . .” In Consideration 
8 the Court recognizes the specific value of religious freedom, and goes on to extend the 
protection of the right of conscience to whoever “establishes a determined hierarchy of ethical 
values that gives special primacy to not endangering the lives of their fellow men and women” 
(Consideration 9). It would be a contradiction in terms, the Court continues, “to protect the right 
to freedom of religion as a manifestation of the right to freedom of conscience without treating 
the latter as something to be protected itself as well.” It adds that in a democracy, the State must 
be “impartial with regards to the governed, even when they practice religions that the majority 
repudiate” (Consideration 10). Subsequently an important point is clarified; that in this case “a 
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contradiction does not exist between rights per se,” “but rather between a right and a legal 
obligation” (Consideration 11) whose non-fulfillment “does not entail serious or imminent harm 
to interests protected by the State”, so that it is possible to find alternatives that reconcile the 
duties of the objector to the State with their personal convictions. Another crucial affirmation is 
found in Consideration 12: “What is at stake is not the . . . legal reach of the religious 
prohibition: ‘Thou shall not kill’ . . . since this Court lacks the competence to interpret religious 
dogma.” In Consideration 13 the Court establishes that objections must be based on sincere 
beliefs that seriously conflict with the challenged obligation. In the end, the Court confirmed the 
sentence on appeal, only changing it so that the military service be completed “without the use of 
arms.” 
 This was a conciliatory ruling. Liberal values were vindicated but the original 
punishment imposed on the objector was not challenged, which is not completely consistent with 
the recognition that the “right of citizens to carry out their mandatory service may be done 
without the use of arms.” It is this right that Portillo simply wanted to exercise. Why should he 
be punished? 
 In Portillo, the Court established the following jurisprudential criteria regarding the reach 
of the right to conscientious objection: 
1. Freedom of conscience is, to begin with the most obvious, a right, and as such cannot be 




2. The right to freedom of conscience goes further than the right to freedom of religion, 
encompassing ethical convictions (“a system of values not necessarily religious,” according to 
Portillo). 
3. The objection must be sincere. 
4. This right requires protection even if the objector belongs to a minority. 
5. Distinction must be made between cases where conscientious objection does not run counter 
to any other rights and cases where it does indeed “entail serious or imminent harm to interests 
protected by the State.” 
6. Whenever possible, reconciling compliance of legal obligations with the convictions of the 
objector must be sought. 
 In Argentine legislation, conscientious objection is accounted for in Law 24,429 
establishing voluntary military service. 
 B) Contemporary Conscientious Objection  
 Appeals to conscience to excuse oneself from complying with legal obligations have 
increased exponentially in every direction. Starting in the second half of the 90s, the debates and 
regulations concerning conscientious objection have acquired much importance in an area where 
basic rights are at stake: that of the laws and regulations of sexual and reproductive health. These 
norms mandate, for example, the creation of programs for public policies on sexual and 
reproductive health, the liberalization of access to surgical contraception, and the supply of 




cases where pathologies of the fetus incompatible with life (like anencephaly) are diagnosed. 
Within some of these norms, specific clauses regulate the differing degrees to which health 
professionals and other actors in the sector have the right to exercise conscientious objection. In 
general the phenomenon arises when a health professional (doctor, pharmacist, etc) objects to 
certain practices, such as contraception (including emergency contraception and tubal ligation) or 
abortion, even in cases where it is legally permitted. 
 These are not isolated incidents. A survey carried out in Argentina in 2001 by researchers 
at CEDES9 revealed that 50% of the professionals surveyed consider that they must not perform 
vasectomies or tubal ligations or provide information on these services. More than 30% hold the 
same beliefs with respect to feminine contraception. One head of obstetrics declared: 
“Emergency contraception is a form of abortion in my opinion, so I won’t even speak of it . . . 
that is why it shouldn’t be used and why I won’t provide information about it or let anyone else 
here provide the information.”10 Law 25,673, which created the National Program for 
Responsible Parenthood and Sexual Health, protects institutional conscientious objection, albeit 
while establishing the obligation to provide referrals in order to guarantee access to the 
Program’s services. Article 6 of Law 26,130, which establishes the Protocol for Contraceptive 
Surgery, also recognizes and regulates the right to conscientious objection on an individual level, 
ascribing to the managers of each establishment the responsibility of making immediate 
replacements available to patients or clients in these cases. 
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 The National Law 26,150 on Sexual Education that creates the National Program of 
Integrated Sexual Education within the National Education Ministry, however, does not consider 
conscientious objection. On the provincial level,11 the reach of the regulations governing 
conscientious objection vary from one jurisdiction to the next. The federal state and the 
Argentine provinces adopted different regulatory options at the moment of implementing the 
constitutional mandate regarding the right to conscientious objection and the rights that it might 
conflict with (see Appendix 1). 
 Not all of these options are equally worthy, and some of them are even questionable for 
the generality they ascribe to the right or for the preference it enjoys over the fundamental rights 
it may conflict with such as the life, health, or autonomy of patients, generally women. 
 C) Relevant Factors for Conscientious Objection in the Context of Sexual and  
  Reproductive Health 
 The following considerations are in my opinion important in evaluating the acceptability 
and the limits of conscientious objection in the field of sexual and reproductive health. These 
factors distinguish the new application of conscientious objection from the traditional one and 
require an innovative approach because of, among other reasons, the rights that are threatened by 
this practice. 
(1) The behavior of objectors is usually motivated by reasons that challenge the morality of 
certain public policies, for example, when the parts of the Criminal Code that allow abortion in 
certain situations are denounced as unconstitutional because the objector rejects those 
exceptions. 
                                                            





(2)  The objection is motivated by the desire to derail public policies on sexual and 
reproductive health. What is sought is not merely an individual exception to a legal obligation. 
The coordinated nature with which conservative bodies and the authorities within the Catholic 
Church promote the massive practice of conscientious objection demonstrates that it is a question 
of collective action that aims for the reform of laws and state decisions and whose consequences 
affect the State’s public policies. 
(3) The actions involved affect basic interests of third parties, by impeding or obstructing 
access to contraceptive methods, or to information on how to avoid unwanted pregnancy, or to 
legally permitted abortions, actions which pose risks to the lives, health, physical integrity, or 
autonomy of other people.12 
(4) The negative impact on rights is made worse by the fact that one group is doubly affected 
disadvantageously, that of women in a state of poverty, which reinforces a dual source of 
structural inequality in a context where sexual and reproductive rights are far from being fully 
guaranteed. For example, denying emergency contraception leads to unwanted births or to 
abortions, and the refusal to perform legally permitted abortions puts at risk women’s lives, 
health, and physical autonomy and integrity. Furthermore, conscientious objection in the domain 
of sexual and reproductive health reinforces the imposition of a deeply unequal ethical 
framework that is based on behavioral stereotypes on women that fixes a subordinate role for 
them by depriving them of control over their sexual and reproductive lives (and this objective 
pejorative result occurs even when objectors are not motivated by these stereotypes). 
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(5) Sexual and reproductive health service providers are professionals. Professions act as 
regulated monopolies. In this sense they are different from other monopolies, which we could 
call irregular and whose existence is undesired. The professionals are granted exclusive access to 
certain practices deemed especially valuable by society. To be a professional is to be part of a 
monopoly: anyone who is not a professional is excluded from the practice in question (medicine, 
law, etc). In exchange for this monopoly, the professionals must satisfy various requirements 
(including formal education, accreditation, oaths, and so on). Once a privileged position is 
obtained, a professional does not enjoy the same level of discretion with respect to obligations as 
a non-professional does.13 It is not unreasonable to include among the professional obligations 
the exclusion of the recourse to conscientious objection in the exercise of the profession when 
this recourse endangers values such as the lives and health of others, or the enjoyment of 
important constitutional and/or legal rights.  
(6) The circumstances of health professionals impose even more stringent restrictions on 
their autonomy. They have an obligation to care for their patients,14 and operate in an arena of 
enormous importance for the type of interests at stake. Cantor and Baum15 emphasize that, unlike 
military conscription (which is obligatory by definition), joining the health profession is entirely 
voluntary, and thus the recourse to conscientious objection must be treated differently.16 These 
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observations appear to support those who assert that being a health professional is incompatible 
with conscientious objection.17  
 Conscientious objection in this case cannot be likened to a mere failure to act on the part 
of any normal person intending to abstain from a course of action they reject on moral grounds. 
The difference between acting and failing to act narrows as regards health professionals. It would 
be a gross oversimplification to speak of merely “not acting” after having taken an oath to serve 
the patients’ interests, after enlisting in the monopolistic exercise of a given activity, and 
becoming part of the health network. The failure to act on the part of someone exercising the 
type of power with which health professionals are invested is morally equivalent to an action, in 
this case an action of obstruction to the exercise of the right to health. 
(7) In Argentina, conscientious objection in the domain of sexual and reproductive health 
occurs in a context where guarantees of equal access without obstacles to these services do not 
exist for everyone. The State does not fully meet its obligations to universally provide sexual 
education. Nor does it meet supply free contraceptive everywhere in its territory to people who 
lack the resources to purchase it. Lastly, the State fails to enforce the text of the Criminal Code 
when abortion is legally permitted in cases when the mother’s life or health are at risk or when 
she has been the victim of rape or is mentally handicapped. In these circumstances, enlarging the 
scope of conscientious objection is not a means to protect rights, but rather to threaten them, and 
to perpetuate unequal conditions for impoverished women, who comprise the majority of the 
victims that suffer from a lack of these services. The exception cannot precede the rule. 
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 If national and international norms are in place in Argentina for the regulation of the 
various sexual and reproductive rights,18 the obstacles to the effective implementation of these 
norms are such that the unrestricted, free, and universal access to the services established by law 
remains illusory. For example, the 2008 CELS Report on Human Rights in Argentina19 makes 
reference to concealment of contraceptives, impeding access to the surgical contraception 
regulated by law, limits on information regarding available contraceptives, purposefully and 
deceitfully failing to place IUDs, and failing to replace expired contraceptives in locations that 
report shortages, out of negligence or for ideological reasons.20 At the same time, the sexual and 
reproductive health policies suffer constant legal harassment by extremist Catholic entities that 
make use of conservative judges to prevent delivery of emergency contraception under the 
auspices of the calamitous Supreme Court decision “Portal de Belén.”21 
 Perhaps the most serious case is that of legally permitted abortions. Article 86 of the 
Criminal Code states that abortions will not be punishable in instances where there is danger to 
the life or health “of the mother,” in cases of rape, or of “affront to modesty [atentado al pudor] 
committed against a mentally deficient woman.” In these cases, access to free and safe abortion 
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is a basic right, given the crucial interests at stake (life or health of the pregnant woman, her 
autonomy, physical integrity).  
There exist, however, many factors which conspire against the effective enforcement of 
this right. In first place is the unjustifiably restricted interpretation of the law by many doctors 
and judges who hold that the danger must be very grave, that mental and social health are not 
included in the concept of health (in opposition to the definition given by the World Health 
Organization), and that the grounds for rape are only applicable in cases involving mentally 
handicapped women. Secondly, many doctors do not dare perform abortions that are not 
punishable because of the latent threat of being subject to criminal complaints. Thirdly, a limited 
interpretation of doctor-patient confidentiality (again in disagreement with the very text of the 
Criminal Code and the most basic rules of ethics) is prevalent, a fact that leads many doctors in 
public hospitals to denounce women who turn to them because of complications suffered in 
clandestine abortions. 
 This scenario of structural impediments to access to the most basic services concerning 
sexual and reproductive health is reflected by the fact that clandestine abortion is the greatest 
cause of maternal mortality.22 The analysis of the right to conscientious objection would be 
radically faulty if it forewent any consideration of the context in which the practice is exercised. 
When this context is characterized by the systematic denial of rights to groups that suffer 
structural discrimination as is the case of women and people in poverty, it could well be that the 
freedom of some is the oppression of others. 
                                                            





(8) Another aspect of the existing conditions that turns out to be relevant is the excessive 
influence of religion in civic affairs. In many cases, conscientious objectors use their objection to 
express religious values, such as those who are against sex outside of matrimony, or against sex 
not oriented to reproduction, or homosexual relations, or the voluntary termination of pregnancy. 
The line separating the right to adhere to one’s religious convictions from an imposition of those 
religious values on another person is very thin. It is just as thin, coincidentally, as the line 
separating church and state. One risk, to take an example, is that the health professionals who 
adhere to the Catholic religion behave as soldiers of faith, illuminated by fatwas such as the 
Circular Letter of 1995, “Evangelium Vitae” by Karol Wojtyla that (in paragraph 28) describes 
the current situation as “a dramatic shock between good and evil and between life and death,” 
that describes on p. 72 the laws authorizing abortion and euthanasia as “lacking authentic legal 
validity,” and as they are not “truly rights or morally obligatory” asserts on p. 73 that “abortion 
and euthanasia are crimes that no human law can legitimate,” going on to affirm that “there is no 
conscientious obligation to obey them and instead a clear and serious obligation to oppose them 
by conscientious objection.” 
 In societies such as the one in Argentina, in which civic life remains strongly conditioned 
by the impositions of the Catholic religion, this factor provides an additional reason to be 
extremely cautious when permitting practices that, in effect, contribute to the cultural hegemony 
of a religious vision. I hasten to add that the common view, very different from mine, is that 
given the large majority of Catholics in our society, the saturation of social life by Catholic 




subscribes to one religion, stronger protection against the influence of that religion in civic life is 
necessary.23 
3. Three Approaches to Conscientious Objection 
A)  The Libertarian and Conciliatory Models 
 Three different models or strategies can be distinguished with regards conscientious 
objection in the domain of sexual and reproductive health services. The first strategy is 
permissive or “libertarian.”24 In this approach, the professional has the right to avoid doing what 
he objects to and cannot even be required to refer the patient to another professional willing to 
perform the objected action. Likewise, the professional is free to reproach the patient if they 
express their intent to use contraceptives or to have an abortion. The professional may give the 
patient the reasons, be they ethical or religious, for their objection, and can also attempt to 
dissuade the patient.25 The patient may of course, as an adult, end the conversation whenever he 
or she wishes.  
 This approach presents several problems. First of all, it presupposes equality in the 
relationship between the professional and the patient, something that in reality is far from the 
truth. The obvious vulnerability, for example, of women in poverty seeking legal abortion in 
public hospitals (who comprise the majority of such cases) reveals the illusion of symmetry 
                                                            
23 Perhaps this paper, as Lucas Arrimada and Gabriel Bouzat suggested, exaggerates the degree of influence of the 
Catholic Church in Argentina. 
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between the patient and doctor. Secondly, it likens the providing health services to providing any 
other good or service, failing to consider the special importance of health (and sexual and 
reproductive health in particular). Thirdly, it is unfair, since it forces the patient to seek 
indefinitely the service they require. Fourthly, the privacy of the patients is compromised, as they 
are subjected to an unwanted evaluation of their behavior or personal preferences. Keep in mind 
that decisions regarding sex and reproduction stem from the very core of our conscience. If so, 
maybe the price of the objector´s purity of conscience is the desecration of the patient´s 
conscience. 
 The libertarian model, however, also permits health institutions to refuse to hire 
objectors. The sanctity of contracts is a universal principle: the objector cannot wield it against 
their patients or the institution for which they work and then protest if hospitals and pharmacies 
use the principle to freely contract employees with whatever stipulations they prefer, including 
the condition that the recruit not be an objector. 
 The second strategy is the “conciliatory” a.k.a the “referral” strategy.26 In accordance 
with this approach, the objecting professional has the right to refuse to perform the service in 
question, but is required to refer the petitioner of the service to a professional who does not 
object. This second strategy has problems as well.27 First of all, from the perspective of the 
objector, as many people have observed, it does not afford much respect. If someone objects to 
the practice of abortion because they consider them the murder of innocent and defenseless 
children, then they will not feel comfortable with a norm that allows them to abstain from 
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practicing abortions without losing their job only if they tell the person seeking an abortion the 
name and address of some other “assassin” prepared to carry out the despicable chore.28 
 Secondly, the strategy is in the end rather unattractive for the person seeking the service. 
Some of the reasons are similar to those that throw into question the libertarian model. There is 
the problem of services that require immediate care (for example in the case of emergency 
contraception). In these cases, referral may effectively be the same as denying the service. The 
referral model, after the libertarian model, also depends on the degree of equality in the 
relationship between the requester of the service and the professional. The doctor-patient 
relationship is asymmetric because of several reasons. There is an asymmetry of information, 
obviously with regards to medical science, but also as regards other aspects of medical activity. 
The doctor is the one who knows medicine, but also the one who knows more about the legal 
aspects of medicine. It is also to be expected that when the factors at stake are as sensitive as 
those related to sexual and reproductive health, the patients find themselves in a position of 
added vulnerability.29 All of these factors are worsened in countries where doctors are 
traditionally granted virtually absolute authority over the patients. The objection of health 
professionals is not an act that occurs in a void or in the context of absolute autonomy of will. It 
takes place in an asymmetric, nearly hierarchical, relationship, and sometimes involves 
submission. What otherwise would amount to the simple exercise of individual freedom runs the 
risk of comprising an act that constrains the freedom and dignity of the patient. The simple 
expression of the reasons for objection can transform into a sort of personal ethic, an unasked for 
sermon, or a humiliating intrusion into the sphere of personal decisions of the patient. 
                                                            
28 R. Dresser, “Professionals, Conformity, and Conscience”, p. 9 
29 El informe del CELS mencionado describe la estigmatización que enfrentan en los hospitales  las mujeres que 




 B) A Third Approach: Conscientious Objection through an Egalitarian Lens 
 Current debates appear dominated by the controversies generated between the libertarian 
and conciliatory models. The weakness of each of these models provides incentive for attempting 
to develop a third strategy, one based on the principle of equality. This principle implies an 
obligation of the state to show equal respect and consideration towards the people subject to its 
empire. It also requires that people dispose of equal resources for the development of their life 
projects. These resources should be understood in a broad sense that includes opportunities, 
material and symbolical goods, freedoms, and so on. A prominent place is occupied by health, 
understood integrally, and sexual and reproductive health in particular. Access to health is a 
basic right, in the sense argued by Henry Shue,30 inasmuch as it is comprised of a bundle of 
interests so crucial that they transcend the distinction between positive and negative rights, 
combining the most salient aspects of both categories. 
 In this approach, the key is minimizing oppression. A democratic community must make 
efforts so the dignity of a person does not become vulnerable, putting their moral integrity in 
danger by forcing them to carry out actions they reject profoundly. If we were not willing to 
make these efforts the community would be oppressing one person, denying their moral equality 
by forcing them to choose between their profession and their conscience. But the approach casts 
one eye on the objector and the other on those affected by the objection. They too have the right 
to not be put in the humiliating position of having to justify their sexual and reproductive 
alternatives to another person, or to listen to an unwanted sermon, or to go from one pharmacy or 
                                                            




hospital to the next until they finally find someone willing to provide them a service to which 
they have a right for legal and moral reasons. 
 The egalitarian focus differs from the other models in terms of the level of analysis of the 
practice in question. The egalitarian perspective adopts a structural point of view31 that holds 
different implications than an individualized, atomist analysis of the conscientious objection. 
From a structural point of view, the combination of the actions of the objectors, which include 
among other things systematically blocking access to sexual and reproductive healthcare, takes 
the issue beyond the confines of mere interaction between doctor and patient. The egalitarian 
approach breaks down the “micro” perspective that obscures an institutionalized practice of 
denying rights. 
 If an egalitarian society accepts that, in principle, people can excuse themselves from 
respecting legal responsibilities for reasons of conscience, in the case of sexual and reproductive 
health there is room for rigorous limitations, such as the following: 
1. Professional responsibility. Once a privileged role is occupied, a professional can no 
longer limit their obligations with the same ease as a non-professional. Conscientious objection 
must be regulated with special attention in a restrictive manner in the exercise of the profession 
when objection implies risks for values such as the lives and health of others or for the 
enjoyment of important constitutional and/or legal rights, especially when joining the ranks of 
the health professionals is entirely voluntary.32 If prohibiting the recourse to conscientious 
                                                            
31 I owe this point to Robert Post. 
32 The idea that voluntary access to a given profession is sufficient reason to disallow exceptions to the 
corresponding duties of that profession could be countered by pointing out the case in which the duty is established 




objections still seems an extreme measure,33 it must not be forgotten that people are objecting to 
providing services in circumstances where access to them is either unavailable or highly 
restricted for the users. The availability of services that are in fact readily accessible is an 
important variable when it comes to recognizing and implementing the right of objectors who 
have a monopoly on providing health services.34 
2. Objection without obstruction: The need for prioritizing access as a precondition for the 
exercise of conscientious objection. Access to health services is a precondition for the 
admissibility of conscientious objection on the part of health service providers. Otherwise the 
freedom of the health professionals would be privileged over the right of the patients to life and 
health. With regards sexual and reproductive health in Argentina, this means that the demands 
for broad protection of objectors must be preceded by guaranteed access – for everyone and 
without restrictions – to these services. 
 The admissibility of objection to the guarantee of effective access to sexual and 
reproductive health services is subject to the argument that could be questioned if the two 
phenomena (objection and lack of access to services) were unrelated. For example, let us 
imagine that women do not have access to safe, legal abortion because of a lack of transportation 
or roads, and that, in addition, there are doctors who object but still enough non-objectors to 
meet the demand for services. In this case, the objector would have the right to question whether 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
legal guidelines in the society in which one chooses to exercise a profession. I thank Javier Couso for laying out the 
dilemma this way. 
33 No one would wish to undergo an abortion performed by a doctor afraid of losing their medical license. The risk 
of reaching this undesirable situation can be limited, and should be compared to the harm implicit in the denial of 
sexual and reproductive rights that the looser notion of conscientious objection can lead to. I thank Kenji Yoshino 
for his comments on this point. 
34 One alternative to strictly regulate the exceptions to the monopolistic provision of healthcare services (mentioned 





his or her right to objection should be admitted, since objecting has nothing to do with the lack of 
access to health services. Whatever our response to this hypothetical situation, it is important to 
emphasize that it is not the case of Argentina. In our connection, the connection between 
objection and the lack of access to these services is much stronger. The objection produces 
(together with other factors) the lack of access – the two phenomena are (to a large degree) part 
of the same problem.35 
3. Transparency and scrutiny of objectors. Objectors’ registry. Public registries must be put 
in place for conscientious objectors. Public and private institutions would thus be able to 
organize themselves and their staff to account for the need to prevent ruptures in their capacity to 
provide the services in order to avoid loss of time and discomfort for the patients.36 Periodically 
the registry should be updated. Registration cannot be automatic and should follow the model for 
conscientious objection used in the military37: every objector must present the grounds of their 
objection ex ante, before a panel comprised of representatives from the medical profession and 
the State – in particular the agencies that guard against discrimination – that will determine: 
a. Whether a sincere ethical or religious belief exists. 
b. Whether the health professional is aware of all the relevant scientific knowledge 
regarding the product or practice in question,38 making sure their action is not motivated by a 
desire to ease their workload or by discriminatory beliefs (including prejudices or stereotypical 
                                                            
35 I thank Agustina Ramon Michel for this observation. 
36 In the Province of Santa Fe, Sexual Health Law 11888 of 2001 in its Article 4 recognizes the right to 
conscientious objection but mandates the government to en ensure access to the services”. The decree regulating the 
Law creates a registry of objectors, not yet implemented. A similar norm in La Pampa was vetoed by the governor in 
2007. 
37 I would like to thank Bo Burt for an illuminating conversation on this point. 





attitudes toward women) and that they are not in favor of imposing ethical or religious values on 
everybody else. 
c. Whether serious harm would be done to the moral integrity of the provider if they 
were forced to perform their professional duty. 
4. Obligatory referral. The most desirable solution is the one that eliminates the conflict 
between the right to objection and the necessity of the patients, thus guaranteeing the health 
service is provided. The cost of the objection must not be transferred to the patient. Health 
institutions must guarantee that no patient be put in the uncomfortable position of having to 
confront an objector, and tolerating objection must not entail the least delay or restriction of 
access to the service. Hence it is the responsibility of the directors of health establishments to 
guarantee that the practice is carried out by means of an effective and immediate referral, 
replacing the objecting staff, or a total ban on objection during medical emergencies. 
5. The public health system. Another factor that justifies the limitation of the right to 
conscientious objection is found in the case of state employees and functionaries of every rank. 
Through them the State acts, and for this reason denying health services in public institutions is 
unacceptable as it would imply a private use of state power, the quintessential abuse of power. 
The State cannot object to or disobey its own norms, and it would be preferable for the State to 
set as a condition for occupying a position in the public health system a willingness to carry out 
all of the services that the position or role requires, unless there is an adjustment available whose 




6.  Institutional objection? An additional limit to the scope of conscientious objection arises 
in the case of the so called institutional objection. Can an objector be a hospital, a school, or a 
pharmacy? A problem can be seen at the first glance. Where is the conscience of these objectors? 
Conscientious objection is indissolubly linked to a mind, to a person of blood and flesh. 
Hospitals and pharmacies do not possess consciences and therefore cannot object. Challenging 
institutional objection this way can be questioned. We must attempt to understand the idea of 
institutional objection in good faith, and it would be unsympathetic to attribute to its defenders 
the notion that entities composed of people have in turn their own conscience, implying then that 
they believe in the existence of supraindividual minds that adhere to moral and religious 
principles. The words “hospital” and “pharmacy” do not invoke supraindividual entities and thus 
their use does not oblige us to contemplate ontological eccentricities, as would an entity lacking 
neurons but possessing conscience. These words are used as shortcuts to refer to groups of 
living, breathing people who interact in a coordinated manner. Hence a defender of institutional 
objection could try to advance institutional objection as the right of these people to object. After 
all, if an individual has the right to “x” course of action, they should not lose this right for 
wanting to exercise it in the company of other individuals, all of whom have the right to do “x” 
as well. Nonetheless, for institutional objection understood in this way to be valid, it must meet 
the strict requirement that every member of the institution be an objector. I do not see how a 
constitutional democracy could allow hospitals and pharmacies to meet this requirement, for it 
would imply setting an exclusive condition for hire at these institutions to being a conscientious 
objector regarding certain practices. This would constitute a blatant form of workplace 
discrimination. Law No. 25,673 and its regulatory decree, which (perhaps in violation of the 




guarantee services and to “refer the populace to other assistance centers.” This norm at least 
recognizes that institutional objection cannot be given unlimited range since referral must be 
provided in all cases. 
 Is the egalitarian model really a “third” model?39 I could be reproached for presenting it 
as a third model when it really is a variant of the referral model. I prefer making a distinction 
between the two models for the following reason. The egalitarian model admits referral 
grudgingly, as a concession made out of regard for the need to be realistic, but only after 
affirming that it would be legitimate (that is, that it would be within the range of admissible 
actions under a democratic framework) to revoke the medical license of objecting professionals, 
and that the rules allowing objection must hold as a prior condition the existence of free, 
unencumbered enjoyment of sexual and reproductive rights. The egalitarian model finishes with 
its acceptance of referral, whereas the conciliatory model starts with it. The egalitarian model 
recognizes that it might be necessary to prohibit objection, which is unacceptable in the 
conciliatory model. Yet it is possible that the difference between the two models is merely one of 
nuance and emphasis. This is fine, as long as it is understood that the implications of the 
difference in nuance can be the difference between life and death for the patients involved.  
[STOPPED HERE]   
4. Objection and disobedience: Classic boundaries and their problems. 
 Before concluding, I would like to analyze a few similarities and differences between 
conscientious objection and civil disobedience. To anticipate a point I will come to later, the 
                                                            




distinction does not, in the end, help very much to resolve the question of objection in the 
context of health because the actions and failures to act go beyond the framework of civil 
disobedience in that they represent violations of basic human rights. 
The customary characterizations of conscientious objection40 concern a crucial difference 
with respect to civil disobedience, that of the type of public commitment that these behaviors 
display. A person who disobeys is protesting against a norm or political decision they consider 
unjust and their disobedience is an attempt to trigger the consciences and sense of justice of their 
fellow citizens in the hope of reforming the norm or decision. Their protest can be directed 
against a policy or a substantive decision, or against a lack of adequate channels for participation 
and debate.41 The person who disobeys is contributing to democratic deliberation by means of 
their behavior, combining their motives with the decision to risk their freedom or physical safety, 
even going as far as to force authorities to employ violence. In this manner they draw attention to 
the lack of grounds for the policies they challenge. People who engage in civil disobedience, 
despite a superficial appearance of paradox, displays by their conduct a profound sense of loyalty 
to rights and to the community. Their disobedience is localized in a defined area, and 
presupposes a confidence in the capacity of their fellows to modify their opinions and listen 
attentively to the reasons they have. The disobedience is not meant to overthrow the government, 
but rather to urge it to change its path. 
 On the other hand, the objector (according to the classical definitions) does not defend an 
idea in a public way or advocating the reform of a norm or decision. They are simply refusing to 
take part in a practice that they object to. They do not attempt to convince anyone, they only 
                                                            
40 That of Rawls, for example in his Theory of Justice. 




want other to leave them and their beliefs alone and not to make them do the things they 
profoundly reject. People who disobey seek a change in the institutions or policies, while people 
who object seek an exception to the norms, not a change in them. In principle, then, the behavior 
of the objector is less disruptive to public order, and the degree of impact on the interests of 
others is less as well. As regards the degree of commitment to public deliberation, the deference 
is notable. Let us take the case of defiance towards patriotic symbols, such as the flag, the 
national hymn, or official honors. An objector simply explains that their (religious or ethical) 
convictions prevent them from standing during the hymn or swear loyalty to the flag. Someone 
who disobeys could be protesting the same obligation, but their refusal to show respect for the 
patriotic symbols will be accompanied with reasons meant to convince others. This person could, 
for example, allege that the norm is perfectionist, or that mandating a sentiment (such as loyalty) 
is contradictory and probably counterproductive. Theoretically, it is even possible that the person 
who disobeys has deep personal respect for the national symbols but rejects that the obligation be 
imposed on the public. 
 Conscientious objection has a more delimited framework than civil disobedience because 
its aspirations as a vehicle for communicating ideas are much more modest. It would be 
reasonable to require that the greater the impact of a behavior on the rights of others is, the 
greater the onus to provide public reasons to justify the behavior. This explains why the range of 
harm to third parties stemming from conscientious objection that can be legitimately tolerated is 
narrower than the range of harms that are normally justifiable in the exercise of civil 
disobedience. Hence we would have at one end of the spectrum of actions that challenge the law 




Article 19 of the Constitution). This group would include the refusal to show respect for patriotic 
symbols. Next to these would be the group of actions that hinder state policies or produce 
inconveniences more or less significant for the rest of society. These are the typical cases of civil 
disobedience such as sit-ins, blocking roads, etc. The case of refusing to join the armed forces 
would belong in the first category of actions when it is a matter of actions by isolated individuals 
for reasons of religious or ethical beliefs. If the refusal to enlist is coordinated and is based on 
dissent regarding a particular armed conflict, I would interpret the action to be an example of 
civil disobedience. Beyond disobedience, when the actions affect the rights of others, or involve 
a higher degree of violence, lie actions we can qualify as rebellious. These last courses of action 
require a much greater justificatory reasoning. Unlike the case of civil disobedience, the rebel 
must be prepared to challenge the legitimacy of a political regime in its entirety or prove that 
their acts prevent much greater harm from occurring.  The extreme illegitimacy of the regime or 
the harm produced by oppression are what justify rebels who, for example, carry out 
assassination attempts against tyrants even when these endanger the safety of innocent 
bystanders. 
 This table regroups what has just been discussed: 
Course of Action:  Conscientious 
Objection 
Civil Disobedience Rebellion 
Reasons: Private (ethical or 
religious) 
Public (denunciation 








Does not challenge 
the norm or policy in 
question – seeks and 
individual exception 
for the objector 
To appeal to the 
sense of justice of 
the community – 
intent to peacefully 
change the policy or 
norm in question 
To overthrow the 
government or 
system, to weaken it 
as much as possible, 
to privately punish 
the oppressors 
Impact on the 
Interests of Others: None or minimal 
Insignificant – does 
not violate basic 
rights 
High (may endanger 
the lives or safety of 
innocent bystanders)
Examples: 
Refusing to show 
respect for national 
symbols; refusal to 
enlist in the army 
(when the refusal is 
isolated, individual, 
and unrelated to 






to enlist in the army 
(when the refusal is 
coordinated, 
includes many 
people, and is based 
on dissent regarding 
a specific war) 






 I recognize that it is difficult to translate the academic tidiness of these distinctions to the 
complexities of real life. The resistance to the draft is a good example, because it is not 
absolutely clear when we it counts as objection or as disobedience. But if the boundaries between 
objection and disobedience are sometimes obscure, I do think the differences between 
disobedience and rebellion are clearer. The distinction is relevant with regards actions described 
as conscientious objection in the domain of sexual and reproductive health. Only in the 
framework of rebellion is it admissible to transgress basic rights of other people. In both cases of 
objection and of disobedience, the impact on the rights of others either does not occur or touches 
secondary rights (the right, for example, to go to a certain restaurant that may be affected by a 
protest that blocks the street). The actions of objecting health service providers threaten the basic 




of a moral or religious crusade, as suggested in the encyclical “Evangelium Vitae”), which are 
difficult to accommodate in a constitutional democracy.     
 The objecting professional cannot defend his or her conduct by renaming it civil 
disobedience since disobedience is only legitimate when it does not affect basic rights, and the 
behavior of objecting health professionals does just that. Therefore, as not even civil 
disobedience justifies the type of impact on the interests of others as is the case in the situation 
we are considering, the pretention that tries to legitimate actions whose effect is to block access 
to contraceptives and safe abortions on the basis of conscientious objection is not acceptable. 
5. Conclusion 
 Conscientious objection inspires natural compassion in freedom loving people. Our 
intuitive reaction is to protect minorities who navigate against the current, who reject some 
aspect of the predominant morality, who refrain from following the flock, and who are prepared 
to sacrifice themselves. The decision of the objector to oppose the power of the state when they 
believe their deepest principles may be in risk of compromise demonstrates the value of integrity 
in its greatest splendor. Challenging power is proof of courage, of independent thinking, and of 
conviction. One example of it is the increasing number of doctors who have become 
conscientious objectors to the practice of feminine genitalia mutilation in Mali.42 
 That sympathetic reaction, however, dissipates when conscientious objection is used as a 
means to reinforce structural and systematic barriers to access to sexual and reproductive health 
services that all people have a right to; when it is used to impose religious or hegemonic belief 
                                                            




systems, or simply to humiliate people who are in a position of vulnerability. In these cases, the 
objection does not equal rebelling against power, but rather is one of the strategies of the 
powerful to deny the enjoyment of basic human rights to others. The objector in this case is not 
swimming against the current; they are part of the current. Protecting the right to objection in 
these conditions does not necessarily represent a defense of freedom, but instead a rather subtle 
form of subjugation.  
 It also bears repeating that conscientious objection in the case of health professionals 
cannot be understood in terms of a failure to act, given the privileged position and the special 
obligations that are conferred to professional exercise in the sphere of health. 
 It makes sense to emphasize once again that conscientious objection exercised by health 
professionals cannot be understood as a mere refusal to act, given the privileged position they 
hold and the special responsibilities that are part of the profession licensed to perform health 
services. 
Lastly, I would like to call attention to the fact that the harm inflicted by the objectors is 
of the same essence as the harm itself they assert they wish to avoid. Conscientious objection 
does not only affect the basic rights of other people, the majority of whom are women, the 
majority of whom are poor. Respecting the conscience of the objector can also imply an offense 
to the consciences of the patients. A woman who has been the victim of rape and solicits a 
prescription for the day-after pill has made an ethical decision of enormous depth and import. 
Erecting barriers to this decision is an insult to her conscience. A person who has decided not to 
have any more children without renouncing their sexuality feels a stranger comes before her 




command of their moral autonomy, seek legal abortion when their lives or health is endangered 
and who find themselves blocked from their right, cannot but feel that the system privileges the 
consciences of some over their own. 




Appendix: Regulatory models for conscientious objection in the domain of sexual and reproductive 
health. 
 In this work three models are mentioned (libertarian, conciliatory, and egalitarian).  The egalitarian 
model has two variants, one restrictive, the other prohibitive. Four regulatory strategies follow from this. This 
piece contests the first two strategies in favor of the restrictive-prohibitive one. 
Model for 
conscientious 
objection in health 
services 
Libertarian  Conciliatory Restrictive Egalitarian Prohibitive 
Egalitarian 
Can the professional 
deny service? 
Yes Yes, except in cases of 
emergency (for 
example, AHE in rural 
areas or where there are 
no nearby pharmacies)  
 
 
Yes, but only:  
1) if they do not work in a public 
establishment, or in an establishment that 
is part of a health network 
2) in a context where there is a high 
degree of access to the services,  
3) If it is explicitly authorized in their 
labor contract (private domain),  
4) following the assembly of a public 
registry of objectors, inscription of which 
is conditioned on restrictive criteria 
(putting each case under scrutiny to 
ascertain the sincerity and personal 
importance of the objection)   
No, it is part of their 
professional 
obligations. 
 If they deny the 
service they must 
surrender their 
license 
Can they refuse to 
provide 
information?  
Yes Yes Yes, under the previously mentioned 
conditions 
No 
Must they refer 




Yes Yes Irrelevante 




Yes No No No 
Does the allowance 
cover institutions? 
Yes Yes No No 
Alegre 
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